The pandemic COVID-19 event may require a strong macroeconomic reaction aimed at absorbing the shock wave on the real economy of households and businesses looming, being the most extreme economic shock after the Lehman Brothers crack. Unfortunately, Corona and Turkish banking system are too incompatible and require a good macroeconomic policy.
Monetary policy must maintain a certain level of liquidity within the financial system and guarantee financing and support conditions for all sectors of the economy as the contraction and slowdown of economic-productive activity would cause a slowdown in the Real GDP, in a significant inflation shock, especially on the demand side, and in an increase in the unemployment rate.
The unconventional expansion measures, as well as their transmission, which appears to be stronger in the presence of high initial levels of indebtedness, operate mainly through the redistribution of income in favor of the debtors thus causing a drop in the rates on new mortgages and the cost of financing.
These operations could affect the banking system and Central Banks and Supervisory Authorities (Central Authorities) in Turkey and other Europe Countries, in order to avoid capital absorption with a negative impact on bank loans, has implemented measures that envisage:
- the flexibility to operate at below the level capital defined by Pillar II, the ability to operate below the buffer capital maintenance (CCB, Capital Conservation Buffer ) and that relating to the coverage ratio of the liquidity (LCR, Liquidity Coverage Ratio );
- a favorable orientation to ‘loosening of reserve capital buffer (CCyB , countercyclical capital buffer) by national authorities;
- the flexibility in the use of partial equity instruments that do not qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 capital to meet the requirements of the second pillar and satisfy the capital needs;
- a high degree of flexibility with regard to the treatment of impaired loans (NPL, Non-Performing Loans ) both in terms of the provision in the income statement;
- new incentives for banks to lend to SMEs
The above measures could affect banks’ capital positions and also various operational aspects, the commercial prospects of institutions with strong repercussions on credit quality, liquidity, and bank profitability. The latter, together with the indices of the banking stock market, will be put under pressure by lower volumes and by the increase in the cost of credit which will determine a contraction in income arising or not from interest, from an increase in losses on loans for operating expenses and other provisions and from the increase in the insolvency rates of households and businesses (NPL ratio).
Banks are among those most likely to be affected by the indirect effects of the pandemic.
This is the reason that prompted the Turkish government and banks to introduce the debt payment delays on loans to temporarily provide assistance to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises damaged by the epidemiological emergency ” COVID-19 “, guaranteeing the suspension of the payment of the capital quota. installments of medium / long-term loans up to three months.
These delay actions must be interpreted as measures aimed at protecting financial stability, and must not be automatically classified as forbearance measures for the purposes of IFRS 9, contrary to the provisions of the current supervisory provisions, as well as among impaired loans.
The Turkish Banking Association (TBB) announces recommendations for banks to limit economic effects of coronavirus in Turkey. This will help create additional reserves that will help maintain the supply of credit and mitigate the slowdown in the financial cycle in order to guarantee an increase in the banking sector’s holding capacity when the systemic risk is deemed to be increasing.
We also expect that there will be taken some additional measures such as:
- no dividends are paid,
- that banks do not make any irrevocable commitments for the payment of dividends for the financial years 2019 and 2020,
- that banks refrain from repurchasing shares aimed at remunerating shareholders.
The reasons why it is necessary to understand the evolution of the credit quality of the various institutions, following changes in macroeconomic conditions, are extremely important in order to assess the resilience of the entire Turkish banking system.
The banks are called upon to prepare an adequate level of capital coverage of their activities by adopting accurate internal detection and control systems in order to continuously and decisively aim at reducing and optimizing the riskiness of loans and, consequently, minimizing the opportunity cost determined by the need to set aside increasing capital for loans with a high degree of risk.
They, therefore, set their optimal capital ratios on the basis of changes in macroeconomic conditions, changing ratios influencing the size of the assets and which they will have to hold in order to meet the capital adequacy requirements required by the Basel Committee.
Turkish banks contribute to the transmission of monetary policy decisions by virtue of the historical relationship between macroeconomic variables and the Tier1 (capital adequacy ratio). This relationship was only interrupted during the bank capital shocks that occurred during 2008 and likewise, to this crisis, Corona could also have prompted rapid changes in the relationships between the economic cycle, the financial market and banking variables.
In the course of 2020, the Turkish banking sector will be called upon to undertake an important company because, in the face of a reduction in profitability, it is necessary to protect the quality of the assets in the light of the long-term NPL (or Non-Performing Exposure) Ratio objectives set by the institutions and to preserve the quantity and the quality of capital endowment ( Tier 1 capital ).
The significant tightening of the rules on non-performing loans may lead to a marked improvement in the quality of banking activities in Turkey. However, the ” lockdown” phase imposed by governments can jeopardize both the possibility of obtaining recoveries through the judicial strategy (it is the case of Turkey that has almost closed all the Courts) and the ability of the debtors to honor extra-judicially all the agreements due following the growing economic difficulties.
The strategies deleveraging and derisking have to consider the changing macroeconomic environment and the impact on banks’ profitability and their budgets; this could translate into a reduction in performance indicators such as the Collection Ratio ( CCR ) and Profitability Ratio ( NPV ratio ).
Looking ahead, there could be a great increase in the Credit Default Swap ( CDS ) and, in the future, investors and rating agencies could use more conservative approaches based on more conservative assumptions in estimating gross times and recoveries. This could, therefore, have negative effects on the sale and subscription prices of the bonds with repercussions on the income statement of the selling banks.
However, the potential adverse effects could be mitigated, or even canceled, through support measures specifically prepared by the government and/or by possible tax benefits Deferred Tax Asset ( DTA ) as provided by the Turkish government which provides important measures in favor of the assignment of impaired loans.
We can say that 2020 will be a difficult year for the Turkish banking system. Although macroeconomic policies will reduce the problem, it will leave serious damage.